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INTRODUCTION

T

HE purpose of this Article is to examine section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and to propose, based upon the
results of such examination, a new regulatory scheme of insider trading
for Japan. The Article will concentrate on the questions of whether
choosing section 16(b) as the mechanism for insider trading regulation
was rational and whether section 16(b) has been functioning efficiently
and equitably. It will also address the questions of what problems are
posed by the dual regulation of section 16(b) and rule 10b-5 2 and what
effect section 16(b) has on affording relief to victims of insider trading.
1. Section 16(b) provides: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, or
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the
part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit
to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction
by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer
if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fall
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale,
or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
2. Rule 10b-S provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce. or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
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A cost-benefit analysis will be used to demonstrate that section 16(b) is
an inefficient means of regulation.
The Japanese Securities Exchange Law (SEL)3 was modeled after
the United States' Securities Act of 19331 and the 1934 Act. The SEL,
enacted while Japan was under the overwhelming influence of the
World War II Occupation forces, remains largely operative today.5
Some branches of the tree of federal securities laws that was transplanted into Japanese soil have died without putting forth leaves while
others have been pruned at the hands of the Diet primarily because of
their incongruity with Japan's unique circumstances. 6 The provisions
dealing with insider trading regulation are among those that have died
or have been pruned. Fortunately, however, the tree itself remains
7
securely rooted.
Recently in Japan, there has been pressure for fundamentally new
legislation directed toward insider trading regulation. 8 To the extent
that this movement merely seeks to attain the fruits of American
development, without first examining the process from which those
fruits were derived, the necessity for insider trading regulation (from
both a legal and an economic standpoint), and, if it is necessary, the
appropriate type, optimal level, and enforceability of such regulation
in the Japanese legal and social climate, the movement will not
significantly improve Japan's current laws. It is the thesis of this
3. Shokentorihiki Ho (Securities Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1948 (amended 19710
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
5. See A. Takeuchi, S. Michida, H. Maeda, M. Tatsuta & T. Tejima, Gendai no Keizaikozo
to Ho 484 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A. Takeuchi & S. Michida]; M. Tatsuta, Securities
Regulation in Japan 10-11 (1970); T. Suzuki & I. Kawamoto, Shokentorihiki Ho 20-22 (196s).
Yazawa, Nippon niokeru Kako oyobi Shorai no Shoken Kisei, in I Amerika To Nippon no
Shokentorihiki Ho 30-31 (L. Loss & M. Yazawa ed. 1975). See generally Fujita, Shokentorihiki
Ho chu Kubun to natteiru jakkan no Joko ni tsnite, Inbesutomento, May-June 1961, at 2.
6. See K. Fujita, Shokentorihikiseidoron 1 (1962); Fujita, supra note 5, at 2-12.
7. See generally Kawamoto, Shokentorihiki no kokusaika ni kansunr ichikosatsu, in 1
Gendaishohogaku no Kadai 109 (Suzuki kokikinen ed. 1975); Yazawa, supra note 5. at 27-408. Tatsuta, Naibushatorihiki no Koka ni Kansuru Ripporonteki Kosatsu, in Kigyoho no
Kenkyu 698 (Osumi kokikinen ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Ripporonteki Kosatsu], Tatsuta,
Naibushatorihiki ni Kansuru Horitsushian to Teianshushi, 746 Shojihomu 1-9 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Tatsuta Proposal]. Professor Tatsuta's draft, which consists of twenty-three
articles, is essentially an "insider trading regulation bill." Professor Tatsuta mainly referred to the
Federal Securities Code of the American Law Institute as a model for his draft.
Other professors assert the necessity of new legislation treating insider trading regulation, but
they do not actually propose a bill. See, e.g., Kanzaki, Beikoku niokert Naibushatorihikikiseino
Hatten, 74 Minshoho Zasshi 759, 802 (1976) (Federal Securities Code of the American Law
Institute and the Corporate Securities Law of California are instructive); Takeuchi, Vaibushatorihiki: Soron, 41 Shoken Kenkyu 133, 146-47 (1975) (Federal Securities Code of the American
Law Institute is instructive); Yazawa, supra note 5, at 36, 37 (new legislation in Japan should be
modeled after the Federal Securities Code of the American Law Institute and the Corporate
Securities Law of California).
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Article that section 16(b)-type regulation is inappropriate for Japanese
as well as American society.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL MISJUDGMENT

A.

Emotional Reaction

A close investigation of the legislative history of section 16(b) of the
1934 Act reveals that Congress reacted emotionally and irrationally in
the wake of the stock market crash-at least from the perspective of
today's historians-in drafting the preventive measure for insider
trading practices. 9 In the climate of "native American radicalism"' 0
and in the furor over the crash, Congress sought the most drastic
mechanism to deter insider trading practices. Thus, Congress, knowingly or unknowingly, chose the costly and harsh regulatory mechanisms of section 16(b) without considering the economic and legal
ramifications. 1 ' Basically, section 16(b) provides that a director,
officer, or ten percent beneficial owner who purchases and sells or sells
and repurchases the stock of his corporation within a period of less
than six months must account to the corporation for the profits he
realizes. 1 2 Aiming for a dramatic effect, Congress erred in selecting
this bootstrap regulatory method of lumping together the actual abuse
of inside information and the nonuse of inside information in trying to
prevent "the unfair use of information."' 3 This disparity between the
end and the means is the source of section 16(b)'s efficiency defects.
Insider trading practices were rampant before the enactment of the
1934 Act. The theory of "caveat emptor" dominated as the only
guiding principle of stock transactions. 14 "Prior to the enactment of the
Securities Exchange Act, profits from 'sure thing' speculation in the
stocks of their corporations were more or less generally accepted by the
financial community as part of the emolument for serving as a corporate officer or director notwithstanding the flagrantly inequitable
9. See 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 121 (2d ed. 1961). See generally Note, An Economic
Analysis of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 389,
389-90 (1976) [hereinafter cited as An Economic Analysis].
10. Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate "Insiders" inthe United
States, 33 Mod. L. Rev. 34, 37 (1970).

11. See generally Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 260, 260 (1968). "It is hardly surprising that lawyers do not attach
much, if any, weight to considerations of resource allocation when they direct their attention to
securities markets problems. In their encounters with the securities markets, malfunctions loom
large .... Of the millions of transactions that occur daily, the lawyer focuses on the few improper
ones, and their importance in the market as a whole is magnified." Mendelson, Book Review, 117
U. Pa. L. Rev. 470, 470 (1969). See also Comment, Section 16(b): Re-evaluation is Needed, 25
U. Miami L. Rev. 144, 145 (1970) [hereinafter cited s Re-evaluation].
12.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), quoted at note 1 supra.

13.
14.

Id.
Loss, supra note 10, at 35.
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character of such trading."'1 5 A survey by the New York Times
reported that in 1915, ninety percent of business executives inter16
viewed admitted to trading regularly in their own company's shares.
After experiencing the crash of 1929, Congress had an extremely
antagonistic attitude toward insider trading:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee
was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which came to
them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type
of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders
who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of
their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to
others. 17

In reaching this view, Congress was furnished with extreme cases of
insider trading to use as its basis of decision. In one case described in a
report by the Committee on Banking and Currency, the president of a
corporation and his brothers made a short-swing profit of approximately $9 million.' 8 The example of Albert H. Wiggin, chairman of
the Finance Committee of the Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit Corporation, had such a decisive influence upon Congress that the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce went so far as to refer to the
proposed section 16(b) as an "anti-Wiggin provision."' 9 Wiggin, knowing in advance that a dividend was going to be passed, sold his block
of 26,400 shares within a five-day period. After the dividend was
passed, the market value of the stock declined sharply from a high of
25 to a low of 11V8.20 Another manipulative practice which incited
Congress' anger was pooling arrangements by insiders. 2 ' An RCA
pooling arrangement made $5 million in only seven days.2 2
Thus, of the millions of transactions that occurred daily, Congress
focused on the few egregious ones and magnified their importance in
15. 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 50 (1944); see Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair
Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 468 (1947).
16. H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 2 (1966).
17. S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934), reprinted in 5 Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 21, at 55 (1973).
18. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934), reprinted in5 Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 17, at 9 (1973).
19. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); see Stock Exchange Practices,
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6555 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings];Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and
H.R. 8720 Before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 134
(1934) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
20. Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res 56 Before the Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3024-27 (1933).
21. S.Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934), reprintedin 5 Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 21, at 55-68 (1973).
22. An Economic Analysis, supra note 9, at 393 n.17.
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the market as a whole. 23 The basic misfortune in enacting the 1934 Act
was that, having no experience in the legislation of securities laws,
Congress had no cases for study other than the quite unusual practices
before and after the stock crash. Congress, with input of unusual
information, produced inadequate output.
B.

Misjudgment in Choosing a Regulatory Mechanism

Historically, the most commonly used legal technique in the United
States-and perhaps in other countries as well-to inhibit a type of
conduct is to enact a provision declaring such conduct "unlawful" and
to impose on a violator criminal penalties or administrative sanctions
and/or civil damage liabilities. The compensatory damage mechanism
is the most suitable method for resource allocation since it reallocates
resources to the individuals to whom the resources should belong. The
Sherman Act 24 utilizes this penalty-compensation mechanism in order
to inhibit anticompetitive conduct. 25 Even the 1934 Act adopts the
penalty-compensation mechanism as its general regulatory method. 26
In contrast, section 16(b) utilizes the automatic disgorgement mechanism as its sole method for inhibiting insider speculation. Thus, among
27
the provisions of the Act, section 16(b) is an aberration.
It is quite logical to ask why Congress, instead of requiring forfeiture
of the profits of insiders, did not explicitly make it unlawful for
insiders to trade on the basis of undisclosed inside information, 28 and
23.
24.

See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 470.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).

25.

For example, § 1 of the Sherman Act declares that "[e]very contract, combination ...

or

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce" is "illegal," and imposes punishment by fine or
imprisonment. Id. § 1. Under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), any private person
"injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . .
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." Id. § 15.
26. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §§ 5, 7(c), 7(f), 8, 9(a), 9(c), 9(e), 10, 12(a), 14(a), 14(b),
15, 16(c), 18(a), 20, 32(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78g(c), 78g(f), 78h, 78i(a), 78i(c), 78i(e), 78j, 781(a),
78n(a), 78n(b), 780, 78p(c), 78r(a), 78t, 78ff(a) (1976)
27.
Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967)

("Section 16(b), it should be emphasized, embodies a rather uncommon regulatory mechanism.').
28. Cal. Corp. Code § 25402 (West 1977), for example, provides: "It is unlawful for an issuer
or any person who is an officer, director or controlling person of an issuer or any other person
whose relationship to the issuer gives him access, directly or indirectly, to material information
about the issuer not generally available to the public, to purchase or sell any security of the Issuer
in this state at a time when he knows material information about the issuer gained from such
relationship which would significantly affect the market price of that security which Is not
generally available to the public, and which he knows is not intended to be so available, unless lie
has reason to believe that the person selling to or buying from him is also in possession of the
information." Accord, ALI Fed. Securities Code § 1603(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
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provide for civil remedies, such as rescission or damages, 29 or criminal
penalties. 30 This is a reasonable question in light of the congressional
hearings which indicate that section 16(b) was specially designed to
protect the outside stockholders against short-swing speculation by
3
insiders with advance information. '
1.

The Disgorgement Mechanism

The only theoretical ground offered by Congress to justify the
disgorgement mechanism was a traditional agency principle: "[Section
16(b)] is simply an application of an old principle of the law that if you
are an agent and you profit by inside information concerning the
affairs of your principal, your profits go to your principal." 32 This
traditional agency principle rests on the notion that inside information
is a corporate asset which may not be expropriated by an insider-agent
33
for personal use.
The fundamental weakness of the corporate asset theory is that no
valid rationale exists for allowing a principal to take away "the
illegally acquired fruit" from an insider-agent. From a broad legal
perspective, it seems unsound for a government to allow or encourage
a person to enjoy profits unlawfully acquired by a third person. The
counterargument is that so long as a principal-agent relationship
exists, the duty of loyalty requires an agent to account for such profits
to his principal. 3 4 But the question is not the propriety of this principle
under the law of agency, but its propriety within the greater legal
framework of society. Moreover, the agency principle alone cannot
justify an accounting for profits when, as can occur under section
16(b), there is no actual use of inside information and hence no abuse
of the principal's assets.
From the more narrow legal perspective of section 16(b), the theory
that inside information is a corporate asset should be critically exam29. Cal. Corp. Code § 25502 (,Vest 1977), for example, provides: "Any person who violates
Section 25402 shall be liable to the person who purchases a security from him or sells a security to
him for damages equal to the difference between the price at which such security was purchased
or sold and the market value which such security would have had at the time of the purchase or
sale if the information known to the defendant had been publicly disseminated prior to that time
and a reasonable time had elapsed for the market to absorb the information, plus interest at the
legal rate, unless the defendant proves that the plaintiff knew the information or that the plaintiff
would have purchased or sold at the same price even if the information had been revealed to
him." Accord, ALI Fed. Securities Code § 1703 (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
30

See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 25540 (West 1977); ALI Fed. Securities Code § 1821

(Proposed Official Draft 1978).
31. See Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 6557-59; House Hearings, supra note 19, at 85.
32. House Hearings, supra note 19, at 133 (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran).
33. Re-evaluation, supra note 11, at 147; see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248
N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
34. W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency § 148, at 243-44 (1964).
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ined. Assets must be characterized in terms of their value and usefulness
to a corporation. 35 It is well established that section 10(b) 36 and rule
lob-537 prohibit a corporation from using inside information in the
stock market. 38 In light of the fact that inside information has little
value or utility to the corporation, the corporate asset theory seems to
have lost one of its major underpinnings. Similarly, it cannot be said
that insider trading usurps a corporate opportunity, since corporations
are legally restricted from trading speculatively.
The agency theory is also inconsistent with the "lowest-in-highestout" computation of profits adopted by the courts. Under this rule,
when a defendant has engaged in a series of prohibited transactions at
varying prices, the "profit" recoverable by the corporation is computed
by matching the highest-price sales against the lowest-price purchases. 3 9 Because there is no provision for offsetting losses against
profits, the defendant may be held liable for "profits" even when he
has sustained an overall trading loss during the six-month period.
Under the law of agency, however, "[a]n agent is under a duty to
account to the principal for any financial benefit received by him as the
direct result of a transaction conducted by him."'40 It naturally follows
that the duty to account is invoked only when a positive benefit
accrues to the agent, and that the agent owes the duty only to the
extent of the actual benefit received. Thus, the lowest-in-highest-out
rule is incompatible with the agency theory underlying section 16(b)'s
disgorgement mechanism.
2. Automatic Liability
A careful examination of the language of section 16(b) and its
legislative history reveals that Congress believed an objective standard
of liability was the most effective means for arresting short-swing
insider speculation. 41 According to Thomas Corcoran, chief spokesman for the draftsmen and proponents of the section, it was purposely
designed as a "crude rule of thumb '42 because of the overwhelming
difficulty in proving that an insider intended, when he purchased stock
35. Re-evaluation, supra note 11, at 147.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
37. Rule 10b-5 is quoted at note 2 supra.
38. Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634
(7th Cir. 1963); R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 947 n.12 (4th ed. 1977); 6 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 3571 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1453 (2d ed.
1961).
39. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 50-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951);
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See
also Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
40. W. Seavey, supra note 34, § 148, at 243 (emphasis added).
41. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
42. Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 6557.
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in his company, to participate in short-swing speculation. Congress
concluded that the efficiency of automatic liability outweighed its
potential unfairness. 43 History, however, has proven section 16(b) to
be an "extremely crude rule of a most deformed and misshapen
thumb." 44 As the Second Circuit pointed out, "Congress decided in
' 45
order to throw out the bathwater that the baby had to go too.'
In summary, the structure of section 16(b) was built on a foundation
of erroneous policy judgments. The most fundamental mistake was
Congress' emotional reaction to the Great Crash. As a result, the
congressional decision was based on the extreme and unusual cases of
insider trading before and after the crash. In trying to achieve a
dramatic deterrent effect, Congress did not adequately consider the
economic effect, efficiency, function, and enforceability of the disgorgement mechanism. Moreover, without conducting a cost-benefit
analysis or even considering economic ramifications, Congress designed the disgorgement mechanism to function automatically. This
decision has lead to dysfunctional and unfair results. Congress' failure
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis was an egregious oversight. Such an
analysis will now be used to demonstrate the folly of section 16(b).

H.

A

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SECTION

A.
1.

16(b)

A Frameworkfor Analysis

Optimal Regulation and Enforcement

To justify the regulation of an economic activity, two tests must be
satisfied: (1) there must be a social need to regulate the activity; and (2)
the activity should be regulated only to the extent needed. In other
words, an appropriate regulatory scheme can be devised only after
balancing the positive values of the economic activity against the
negative values.
43.

Id.

at 6558; see Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970) ("This

[objective] approach maximized the ability of the rule to eradicate speculative abuses by reducing
difficulties in proof.'), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971). The court in Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d
507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967), explained congressional intent in this way.
"In order to insure discouragement of unfair insider short term trading allinside trading within a
less-than-six-month period is discouraged. The arbitrary, some might say Draconian, nature of
this statute reflects the view of experts who testified at the hearings leading to the passage of the
1934 Act that the unfair use of information by corporate insiders could only be effectively curbed
by a law that made it unprofitable for insiders to engage in any short-term trading, whether fair
or unfair. . . . In order so to insure that Section 16(b) efficaciously put an end to unfair insider
trading, Congress explicitly made irrelevant the intent of any insider who engages in a short.term
transaction, and did not condition the section's application on proof of an insider's intent to trade
on a short swing." Id. at 515 (footnote omitted).
44. Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 331 F.Supp. 787, 792 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
afd,

45.

506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), aft'd, 423 U.S. 232 (1976).

Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
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As to the first test, which might be called a cost-benefit analysis at
the level of necessity, a generally accepted notion is that "in deciding
whether a legal regime should be adopted, it is necessary to identify
and quantify benefits as well as costs." '46 When the benefits (B) which
a society obtains from the economic activity are less than the cost (CO),
society feels a need for some regulation of the economic activity. This
phenomenon is represented in the formula:
B <C

O

As the subjective term "feels" implies, a society may react to some
extent on the basis of a moral or political judgment.
Under the second test, which may be called a cost-benefit analysis at
the level of enforcement, four more costs should be considered: costs
incurred by eliminating or diminishing the positive values of the
economic activity (C2 ); costs of enforcement (C3 );47 costs of errors (C4 );
and incidental costs (C5). The costs of errors include both the risk of a
regulation's being imposed on a person whose conduct does not violate
the regulation 4 8 and the risk of a regulation's being automatically and
indiscriminately applied to a person whose conduct is not harmful to
the regulatory purposes. Another cost to consider is that, unless the
regulation is completely effective, some amount of C O will remain (CI).
When the two tests are considered together, a regulation can be
justified only if the costs to society with regulation are less than the
should
scheme
costs to society without regulation. Thus, a1 regulatory
4
3
2
satisfy the following formula in which C + C + C + C + C5
represents the total costs of regulation:
C 1 + C2 + C3 + C 4 + C5 < C O

The formula, however, does not indicate the optimal level of regulation. The cost of total enforcement (i.e., Cl = 0) is generally considered
prohibitive. 4 9 "The goal of enforcement ... is to achieve that degree of
compliance with the rule of prescribed (or proscribed) behavior that
the society believes it can afford."5 0 Figure 1 illustrates that the
46.
47.
48.

Schwartz & Tullock, The Costs of a Legal System, 4 J. Legal Stud. 75, 76 (1975).
Id.
Id.

49. An Economic Analysis, supra note 9, at 403. For a highly sophisticated and theoretical
economic analysis of the present system of insider trading regulation, see Note, A Frameworkfor
the A llocation of Prevention Resources with a Specific Application to Insider Trading, 74 Mich.
L. Rev. 975 (1976).

50. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 526 (1970). Stigler
states: "[T]here is one decisive reason why the society must forego 'complete' enforcement of the
rule: enforcement is costly. Id. at 526-27.
"The extent of enforcement of laws depends upon the amount of resources devoted to the task.
With enough policemen almost every speeding automobile could be identified.... Such a level of
enforcement would of course be enormously expensive, and only in crimes of enormous Impor-
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optimal level of regulation occurs at P 1P. P represents the lowest point
of costs and P 1 represents its corresponding degree of enforcement.

Co

-

-

C',

-

-

I

CD

I

0

I

0

(C2+C3+C4+C5)

0

Ii

C

1

P1

100

PERCENT OF ENFORCEMENT
FIGURE 1

Figure 1 demonstrates that a departure from the optimal level of
regulation, in either direction, necessarily entails greater total costs for
society. The more complete and the stricter the regulatory scheme a
society chooses, the greater the enforcement costs (C' + C 3 + C 4 + C 5 )
it must bear. Similarly, the looser the regulations a society has, the
greater the benefit-related costs (CI) it will have.
When benefits society derives from the economic activity (B) are
taken into consideration, an enforcement range is created', within
which the regulation is useful for society. The range will be referred to
as the range of beneficial enforcement. The amount of benefits has
been assumed to be a constant.
tance will such expenditures be approached. The society will normally give to the enforcement
agencies a budget which dictates a much lower level of enforcement." Id. at S27. The article
primarily discusses a criminal case, but the principle which it develops is also applicable to an
economic regulation.
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2

In Figure 2, p2_p3 is the range of beneficial enforcement in which the
benefits socdety derives from the economic activity exceed the costs of
regulation. P1 is the optimum level of enforcement. In the O-P 2 and
P3-100 ranges, the costs of regulation exceed its benefits.
Society, however, does not necessarily behave solely on the basis of an
economic rationalization. 5 1 When a society adopts a legal regime,
moral or political elements often play an influential role. A society may
therefore act irrationally from an economic perspective; it may feel a
necessity to regulate the economic activity beyond the optimum level of
enforcement. 52
2.

A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Congressional Intent Underlying
Section 16(b)

By rejecting the necessity of showing actual use of inside information, Congress intended to create a sweeping deterrent effect. In
51.

See pt. I(A) supra.

52. On the economic study of law generally, see R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed.
197 7). Posner also discusses the problem of "insider trading and entrepreneurial reward." Id. at
307-09.
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reaching this result, however, Congress seemed to have had little
regard for the economic ramifications of this draconian 100% enforcement. Of course, the six-month limitation on the enforcement of
section 16(b) suggests that Congress took the harsh economic influence
of the rule into consideration. Support for this argument can be found
in a statement made by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) thirty years after the enactment of section 16(b) that "[t]he
provisions of section 16 do not interfere with an insider's investment
transactions. '5 3 Moreover, the court in Blau v. Max Factor & Co. 54
noted that "Congress sought to minimize misuse of confidential information, without unduly discouraging bona fide long-term investment." 55 The argument, however, loses its force upon examination of
the congressional records, which noticeably lack a careful consideration of the severe effects of 100% enforcement of the section within the
six-month limitation.
There are two primary ex poste explanations of the congressional
intent underlying section 16(b). More than likely, Congress believed
that short term insider trading was completely lacking inherent social
benefit. Figure 3 represents a cost-benefit analysis of this explanation.
Co

C')
0

P

-I

(C3+C4+CS)

(C

._.
P'

0

100

PERCENT OF ENFORCEMENT
FIGURE 3
53. SEC Legislation, 1963: Hearingson S.1642 Before a Subcomnn of the Comm on Banking
and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1963).
54. 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
55. Id. at 308.
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The benefits (B) would equal zero and C2 (the social costs caused by
diminishing or negating the positive values .associated with insider
trading) would also equal zero. Furthermore, it is possible that Congress estimated the value of CO to be great, and the sum of C 3 , C4 , and
C 5 at 100% enforcement to be far less than the cost of no enforcement.
The difference between Q (the cost of 100% enforcement) and P (the
cost of optimal enforcement) would be quite negligible as compared to
that between C O (the cost of no enforcement) and P.
Another explanation of congressional intent, perhaps more generous
toward Congress, is that 100% enforcement was thought to be the
most inexpensive method for society to prevent the abuses of insider
information. Figure 4 represents a cost-benefit analysis of this ex poste
explanation; B as well as C2 would again equal zero. It is possible that
Congress estimated the value of C O to be extremely high, and the sum
of C3 , C 4 , and C5 at the point of 100% enforcement to not only be far
less than the costs of no enforcement but also to be the most inexpensive cost of enforcement (P).

Co

'C,
o0

CO
c)

.

(Cl +C3+C4+CS )

0

100
P1

PERCENT OF ENFORCEMENT
FIGURE 4
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These cost-benefit analyses of congressional intent call for a careful
examination of whether the congressional estimate of each cost is
reasonable and whether there have been any changes in these costs due
to later judicial developments. The questions to be addressed are: (1)
whether insider trading truly has any inherent social benefit; (2) if it
has, what are the social losses (C2 ) caused by reducing or eliminating
the positive values associated with insider trading; (3) whether the
value of C O is as high as had been assumed;5 6 (4) whether there was a
congressional miscalculation with regard to C3 ,57 C4 1. and C5,5 and
(5) whether section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have rendered section 16(b)
superfluous. 60 The following analysis of these questions leads to the
conclusion that, contrary to ex poste assumptions of congressional
intent, section 16(b) is a costly system for a society. One can persuasively argue that the regulatory scheme of section 16(b) far exceeds the
optimal level of enforcement. It falls in the P3 -100 range in Figure 2.
B.

The Positive Value of Insider Trading

Economic activities have two facets: positive value and negative
value. Regulation of economic activities leads to diminishing both the
positive value and the negative value. Diminished positive value
is, as mentioned earlier, one of the economic costs of regulation. 61 The
existence of the positive value of insider trading has been almost
completely ignored, either intentionally or because of the overwhelming hostility towards such trading. There are, however, economists
and scholars who recognize the positive value of insider trading. 62 It is
necessary to recognize the positive value of insider trading not because
recognition supports nonregulation, but because regulation requires

56. See pt. 11(B) infra.
57. See pt. H1(C) infra.
58. See pt. 11(D) infra.
59. See pL 11(E) infra.
60. See pt. 11(F) infra.
61. Wu, supra note 11, at 269 ("We must know all of the costs and benefits of [the regulation),
and the benefits from requiring equity between individual investors must justify any economic
costs.").
62. Professor Mane is one of the leading defenders of insider trading. See note 64 infra and
accompanying text. Commentators who recognize the positive value of insider trading include:
Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Excange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down
the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 Cornell L. Q. 69 (1966); Wu, supra note 11, at 269; Wu,
Corporate Insider Trading in the Stock Market, 1957-1961, 2 Nat'l Banking Rev. 373 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as CorporateInsider Trading]; Re-evaluation, supra note 11, at 155-56; Wu,
Letter to the EUtor, 45 Harv. Bus. Rev. 184 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Letter]; see Lorie &
Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J. Law & Econ. 35
(1968).
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justification. Therefore, every conceivable value of the activity must
be considered. It is imperative to emphasize that the following arguments are not being presented for the purpose of proposing the
nonregulation of insider trading,
but only for the purpose of completely
63
examining section 16(b).
1.

Stimulus to Innovation

Professor Henry Manne asserts, as his principal affirmative argument for insider trading, that "profits from insider trading constitute
the only effective compensation scheme for entrepreneurial services in
large corporations." 6 4 By "entrepreneur," he means an innovator, a
person who finds a new idea and causes it to be put into effect.
Innovation may be the invention of a new product, the reorganization
of corporate administration, a corporate merger, or the selection and
63. Furthermore, this author does not agree with Professor Manne's argument that outsiders
ultimately suffer no loss from insider trading practices. See H. Manne, supra note 16, at 93-110;
Manne, Insider Tradingand the Law Professors, 23 Vaid. L. Rev. 547, 551-661 (1970) (hereinafter
cited as Insider Trading and Law Professors]; Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 113, 115 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Defense]. Manne relied entirely on Schumpeter's
theory, which was not accepted by all economists. Manne also has been criticized by an
economist for having missed the real economic issues. Letter, supra note 62. Professor Manne
himself admits that he missed certain economic issues. Insider Trading and Law Professors,
supra, at 565.
64. Defense, supra note 63, at 116; accord, H. Manne, supra note 16, at 131-46; Insider
Trading and Law Professors, supra note 63, at 578-88. Professor Manne has contended that
insider trading regulation is not necessary. H. Manne & E. Solomon, Wall Street In Transition
(1974); H. Manne, supra note 16, at 93-110; Defense, supra note 63; see Insider Trading and the
Law Professors, supra note 63; Manne, Should Fund Managers Use Inside Information Personally? Yes, Institutional Investor, May 1967, at 19. Despite theoretical support, this contention has
been criticized. See, e.g., Kripke, Book Review, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 212, 212 (1967).
Professor Jennings argues that Manne does not "come to grips with the social and political
question whether the level of corporate amorality proposed by him would be tolerated by our
society." Jennings, Book Review, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 1229, 1235 (1967). Professor Jennings,
however, ignores the question of whether the present level of federal insider trading regulation
under § 16(b) should be tolerated by our society. Professor Loss criticizes Manne's argument by
writing that: "The grievous defect of the Manne thesis is his apparent scorn for the moral or
public opinion factor .
5 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 2999 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). Professor
Painter concludes: "The answer . . . can scarcely be, as [Manne] would suggest, a return to
laissez-faire; rather, it lies in a more enlightened and intelligible pattern of governmental regulation
protecting the individual investor without significantly impairing individual initiative and resourcefulness." Painter, Book Review, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 146, 155 (1966).
Admittedly, insofar as Manne asserts that insider trading should be absolutely unfettered, he
may be criticized for trying "to turn the clock back on legal developments over the last half
century." Jennings, supra at 1229; see Ripporonteki Kosatsu, supra note 8, at 669. His economic
approach to insider trading regulation, however, is worth re-evaluating for those who know the
fallacy of § 16(b)-style regulation and who must try to prepare more equitable and reasonable
regulatory methods. See Wu, supra note 11, at 261. Although Professor Wu criticizes some of
Manne's economic analysis, id. at 260 n.3, he ultimately supports Manne's contention that the
current regulation of insider trading may be harmful. Id. at 269; Corporate Insider Trading,
supra note 62, at 373-81; Letter, supra note 62 at 186.
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guidance of managers. The entrepreneur is therefore distinguishable
from the manager who simply administers a business along lines
already determined. Manne says that, "[t]o provide an effective incentive, entrepreneurial compensation has to be available when the benefits are realized by the corporation. ' 6 5 A salary or bonus is inappropriate, because both of them represent the market price for managerial
skills, not the market price for entrepreneurial skills. Stock options and
bonus plans provide some motivation for entrepreneurs, but not
enough to take great personal risks. 66 According to Manne, "[if these
[entrepreneurs] were to be limited to the same compensation as their
dull unimaginative, and overly conservative predecessors, what incen67
tive would they have to innovate?"
Of course, the idea of entrepreneurial compensation has been bitterly opposed by law professors. 6 8 Obviously, Manne's attempt to
justify insider trading by relying on the idea of entrepreneurial compensation is understandable only as a sort of political ideology for the
survival of a capitalistic dynamics, and not as a sophisticated legal
theory. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the cost-benefit analysis it
should be recognized that insider trading has some effect in stimulating
entrepreneurial activities. It is difficult to argue with Manne's contention that the greater the compensation offered for performing an
activity, the greater the level of activity. 69 The cost-benefit analysis of
this Article poses the serious question of whether section 16(b) protects
the investor without significantly repressing individual ingenuity.
2.

Liquidity

The function of a securities market is to facilitate the flow of savings
from the public to industry and the changes in the asset composition of
investors. 70 The advantage of equity investment for investors is liquidity. Because of the existence of securities markets, investors can
withdraw their invested funds by selling their stocks at any time on the
markets at a reasonable price. The reduction of investment risk
65. Defense, supra note 63, at 117 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 119.
67. Id.
68. Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 720, 730;
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53
Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1457 (1967); Jennings, supra note 64, at 1233-35; Kripke, supra note 64, at
216-17; Painter, supra note 64, at 152-60.

69. Insider Trading and Law Professors, supra note 63, at 582. Judge Learned Hand aptly
stated: "I conceive that the law allows a director to increase his stake in the company, because it
adds to his incentive to make it succeed; the greater the prize, the greater the effort; it will
dampen his zeal, if his holdings must be frozen at what he has when he is elected." In re Calton
Crescent, Inc., 173 F.2d 944, 952 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949).
70. Letter, supra note 62, at 184.
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provided by liquidity thus attracts more investors to equity investment. Therefore, "[t]he degree of success of a stock market in fulfilling
its promotional function-facilitating optimum saving-investment
flows-depends largely on its ability to provide liquidity. ' 71 A liquid
market always has enough potential buyers to meet the demands of
potential sellers. Thus, the price of stocks transacted in a liquid market
is stable.
According to classical economic theory, liquidity is fostered by
speculation which provides "an active and broad market," and reduces
72
"intertemporal differences in price."1
For the classical economists,
speculators are those who have better-than-average foresight and
know the normal price in the market. Speculators tend to "buy when
the current price is below normal and [to] sell when it is above
73
normal," thus stabilizing prices.
Corporate insiders frequently have been regarded as successful
speculators. The following testimony, before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which was then considering the
repeal of section 16(b), was offered to explain why corporate insiders
make good speculators:
[S]ection 16(b) has driven out of the market the best informed buyers and sellers,

those whose valuation of the security should be the soundest. It has driven out of tile
market those who would be most interested in preserving an orderly, stable, liquid
market for their company's securities. It has driven out of the market those who would
be most interested in protecting their company's securities from sudden and unreasonable price fluctuations and who would be a great stabilizing influence in times of stress.

All in all, it is an unintelligent and unreasonable restriction upon the normal forces of
supply and demand. It is inconsistent with the sound concept of a free and open
market and operates to the detriment of investors and the quality of the market.1 4
Furthermore, the President of the San Francisco Stock Exchange,
representing the viewpoint of regional stock exchanges, argued that
section 16(b) was detrimental to regional exchange markets. 75 According to his argument, a large number of the companies having securities
listed on a regional exchange are family or close corporations, and a
substantial percentage of the shares almost universally remain in the
hands of the former owners even after listing. He alleged:
In such cases, to set up limitations upon the purchase and sale of securities of these
companies which may deprive the market of support in times of stress, or eliminate the
71. Wu, supra note 11, at 263.
72. Id. at 265.
73. Id.
74. Proposed Amendments to the SecuritiesAct of 1933 and to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Hearings on H.R. 4344, H.R. 5065, H.R. 5832 Before the House Comm. on Interstate &
Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1415 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ProposedAmendments)
(statement of William B. Putney III).
75.

Id.

at 1318 (statement of Sidney L. Schwartz).
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supply of stock, is an act which can be harmful to the interests of the public and
specifically to the interests of the company's stockholders. Obviously, the limitation of
action such as is implicit in section 16(b), on the part of officers, directors, and
principal stockholders of small local companies is much more harmful to the public
76
interest than it is in the case of companies with Nation-wide security distribution.

In 1941, concern over the adverse economic effects of section 16(b)
prompted representatives of the securities industries to draft proposals
for repeal of the section. Although these industry proposals were
extreme in concluding that "the disclosure provision of Section 16(a)

and the prohibition of short sales contained in Section 16(c) are
effective deterrents to the unfair use of inside information and that

further deterrents are unnecessary,

77

the reasons offered for repeal of

section 16(b) are worth considering. The proposals noted that an
insider who buys the stock of his company to prevent a sudden or
unreasonable decline must face, in addition to the risk of loss, confiscation of any profit. 78 The industry proposals concluded that it was
difficult to calculate the "extent [to which section 16(b) had] contributed to the non-liquid character of markets . . . or to the sudden
fluctuations in security prices. However, so long as this provision
remains in the law the most reliable sources of market support in times
of stress will for all practical purposes remain closed. ' 79 They also
concluded that the defects of section 16(b) eclipse its benefits.80
Empirical studies verify that corporate insiders are speculators who
create liquidity. One study of insider trading from 1950 to 1960 using a

76. Id. at 1320 (statement of Sidney L. Schwartz).
77. Investment Bankers Association of America, National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc., New York Curb Exchange, and New York Stock Exchange, Report on the Conference with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Its Staff on Proposals for Amending the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 263 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Industry
Proposals]. But see 66 ABA Ann. Rep. 356-57 (1941). Section 16(a) is quoted at note 188 infra.
Section 16(c) of the 1934 Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any such beneficial owner,
director, or officer, directly or indirectly, to sell any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security), if the person selling the security or his principal (1) does not own the security
sold, or (2) if owning the security, does not deliver it against such sale within twenty days
thereafter, or does not within five days after such sale deposit it in the mails or other usual
channels of transporation; but no person shall be deemed to have violated this subsection if he
proves that notwithstanding the exercise of good faith he was unable to make such delivery or
deposit within such time, or that to do so would cause undue inconvenience or expense."
15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1976).
78. Industry Proposals, supra note 77, at 261.
79. Id.
80. Id. Since the Industry Proposals, there has been a continuing demand for § 16(b)'s repeal.
Part 2 Investor Protection:Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. 1642 Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1201
(1963-1964) (letter from William L. Cary). For example, the Committee on Securities Regulation
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York proposed to reduce substantially the scope
of § 16(b). Id.
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stratified random sample of 105 New York Stock Exchange companies
concluded that "[iinsiders tend to buy more often than usual before
large price increases and to sell more than usual before price decreases." ' The study also concluded that "the skill of insiders in
forecasting large price changes is demonstrated. '8 2 Another empirical
study by an economist provides further evidence suggesting that
83
insider trading, at least in the long run, may be price stabilizing.
3.

Allocational Efficiency

Another important function of the securities market is to facilitate
the flow of savings to the most productive industries. "A wellperforming capital market will allocate a given volume of savings in
such a way that those industries with the highest prospective rates of
return will receive the greatest amounts. ' 84 For this purpose, the price
mechanism of securities markets must be allowed to function fully.
Only in markets where a fair price determination is being made do
stock prices "reflect the 'intrinsic values' of the companies. 8 In order to
realize a fair price determination, the markets must have full access to
information about companies. It is arguable that complete and constant disclosure of information by companies is, practically speaking,
infeasible. There are many factors that will always prevent the
achievement of full disclosure. 8 6 For example, stock exchange guidelines for timely disclosure are not legal obligations. It has also been
argued that it is legally permissible for a company to withhold material
information from the public under certain circumstances. 8 7 Thus,
commentators have recognized the important role of insiders as
forecasters; by channeling additional information into the market
through their trading activities, insiders increase the likelihood of fair
price determination*88
C.

Problems in Enforcing a Disgorgement Mechanism by Private
Litigation:An Enforcement Cost

Congress thought that private plaintiffs would aggressively bring
section 16(b) suits, and relied on the deterrent effect of private action
to compensate for the limited manpower and budget of the SEC. As
Thomas Corcoran reported to Congress: "[Y]ou have made the stock81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
393-96
88.

Lorie & Niederhoffer, supra note 62, at 52.
Id. at 47.
Corporate Insider Trading, supra note 62, at 381-82.
Letter, supra note 62, at 186.
Wu, supra note 11, at 264 (footnote omitted)
See Insider Trading and Law Professors, supra note 63, at 569-74.
Williams, Corporate Publicity, in Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 391,
(1973).
Wu, supra note 11, at 266; Letter, supra note 62, at 186.
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holders your policemen. ''89 It may be true that without the efforts of
private plaintiffs, the SEC would have an onerous burden in enforcing
the securities laws. 90 The problem with this view, however, is that
private litigants generally will act as policemen only when there is a
private profit or other incentive for bringing a suit. A private damage
suit can provide such an incentive. 9 1 The Supreme Court, in J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 92 noted: "As in antitrust treble damage litigation, the
possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most
93
effective weapon.1
The disgorgement mechanism of section 16(b), however, provides
little or, in most cases, no incentive for individual shareholders to
bring a suit for forfeiture of profits, the recovery of which will inure to
the corporation. The shareholders' benefit, if any, would only be an
incidental pro rata share of the increase of corporate assets.94 It is not
surprising, then, that from 1934 to 1951 only thirty-one section 16(b)
actions were commenced. 95 The lack of shareholder interest in section
16(b) for almost two decades after its enactment reflects the inherent
96
weakness of the statute as an enforcement tool.
In recent years, attorneys have gravitated toward section 16(b) cases
because of the allurement of high fees in such actions. One commentator has said that "[1]iberal rulings with respect to attorney's fees have
made the members of the bar section 16(b)'s policemen." 9 This
89. House Hearings, supra note 19, at 136. Corcoran clearly made a mistake in overestimating the private incentive given to the shareholders under § 16(b) when he stated: "The fact
that the stockholders, with an interest, are permitted to sue to recover that profit for the benefit of
the company, puts anyone doing this particular thing, in the position of taking risk that
somebody, with a profit motive will try to find out. The section is a deterrent, and you will in
some cases actually catch violators." Id. at 137.
90. Lundquist, Private Civil Action (pt. 1), in Enforcement and Litigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws 111, 124 (1970). As to the function of private litigation under the securities law,
see K. Kanzaki, Shokentorihikikisei no Kenkyu 150-53, 161-64 (1969); Cohen, The Development
of Rule lob-5, 23 Bus. Law. 593, 597 (1968); Pitt, An SEC Insider's View oft/he Utility ofPrivate
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 5 SEC Reg. L.J. 3 (1977).
91. "The policies underlying the securities laws are enhanced by permitting private recoveries
as the possibility of these recoveries is a deterrent to violation of the laws." Lundquist, supra note
90, at 124.
92. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
93. Id. at 432.
94. Re-evaluation, supra note 11, at 160.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Re-evaluation, supra note 11, at 160 n.91. The Second Circuit has stated that "[since in
many cases such as this the possibility of recovering attorney's fees will provide the sole stimulus
for the enforcement of § 16(b), the allowance must not be too niggardly." Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). It is not uncommon for the
award of attorney's fees to be 50% of the sum recovered. 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1052 (2d
ed. 1961). For example, the plaintiff's attorney in Grossman v. Young, 70 F. Supp. 970
(S.D.N.Y. 1947), was awarded a fee of $42,500 out of a total recovery ot $85,000. For cases which
have allowed liberal attorney's fees, see 2 L. Loss, supra, at 1052 nn.70 & 71.
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tendency, however, should be subject. to critical scrutiny. 98 Some
courts have attempted to analyze the problem of attorneys policing
section 16(b) by balancing the necessity to regulate insider trading
against the evils of champerty. 9 9 The problem, however, is multifaceted. First, large attorney's fees themselves constitute a social cost
which society must bear. 10 0 Second, awarding attorney's fees-which
are essentially a part of the insiders' illegal profit-is a mis-reallocation
of social resources because while the attorney benefits, the injured
outsider-shareholder remains uncompensated. Third, payment of attorney's fees dissipates the insider's resources thereby impeding recovery by injured parties in a section 10(b) suit. 1 0'
D.

Cost of Errors

(C4 )

The cost of errors
is inevitable under section 16(b). Congress
anticipated this cost when it chose the 100% automatic enforcement
mechanism. 10 2 Congress' failure was its underestimation of the cost.
The effect of section 16(b) is to eject from the markets every instance of
insider trading which falls within the six month limitation, regardless
of whether the trading is actually harmful to the regulatory purpose.
To apply the sanction to innocent persons is itself a social cost (C4 ). In
addition to this cost, the secondary costs incurred by such an erroneous
application may be even more serious to society. This, in other words,
raises "the serious economic question of whether the public interest is
not better served by having a buyer or seller'10even
though he be an
3
insider than to have no buyer or no seller.'

98. "[T]he issuer may conclude that the action has been commenced not for the benefit of the
issuer or its shareholders, but primarily to gain a fee for the security holder's attorney."
Comment, Insider Trading: The Issuer's Disposition of an Alleged 16(b) Violation, 1968 Duke
L.J. 94, 103-04.
99. See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
100. Professor Loss urges that the SEC should take a more active enforcement role in order to
mitigate this cost. 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1053-54 (2d ed. 1961); see 5 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 3017-21 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). In this connection it is interesting to note the province of
Ontario concluded in 1965: "This simplified derivative action has the result in the United
States of inducing persons, usually lawyers, to cause these actions to be instituted for the purpose
of obtaining legal fees. This is an unseemly procedure ... and we do not recommend its adoption
in Ontario. . . . In order to provide the effective remedy which we feel is necessary, a
governmental agency should have the right to bring the action if the company fails to do so within
a reasonable time. The Ontario Securities Commission is the logical agency to assume this
responsibility." Att'y Gen. Comm. on Securities Legislation in Ontario
2.28-.29 (1965), quoted
in Whitney, Section lob-5: From Cady, Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure, 21 Bus.
Law. 193, 208 (1965).
101. The Federal Securities Code of the American Law Institute provides that the profit paid
to the issuer is recoverable by the insider to avoid double liability. ALI Fed. Securities Code §
1714(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
102. See pt. I(A) supra.
103. Proposed Amendments, supra note 74, at 1341 (statement of Kenneth L. Smith).

1979]

INSIDER TRADING REGULATION

E. Inefficiency, Inequity, and Unpredictabilityof the Automatic
Disgorgement Mechanismn: Incidental Costs
Congress imposed three basic limitations on the use of section 16(b).
First, an insider transaction must fall within a six-month period to be a
target of section 16(b). 10 4 Second, an insider must be a director or an
officer or a ten percent beneficial shareholder of the issuing corporation
to come within section 16(b) coverage. Third, an insider-shareholder
must hold ten percent or more of the shares of the issuing corporation,
both at the time of the purchase and at the time of the sale, to be a
section 16(b) target.
The rationale for imposing these restrictions seems to be that the
section's automatic weapon cannot be used without appropriate restraints because its destructive power is indiscriminate. I°5 Additionally, "[t]he narrower the class of potential defendants, the greater the
probability of holding insiders liable.' 0 6 Unfortunately, as one commentator suggests, these rigid limitations are conducive to evasion by
shrewd insiders.' 0 7 Accordingly, it is quite possible that the efficiency
of section 16(b)'s rigid limitations is unavoidably circumscribed.
The limitations also cause an inequitable imbalance between those
insiders who fall just inside a limitation and those who fall just
outside, 10 8 even though there may be no essential difference between
the acts of either. Section 16(b), then, functions only as a "trap for the
unwary,"109 for it catches the pitiable "minnows" while letting the
more clever and crafty "big fish" escape. 110
Despite its rigidity, section 16(b) is frequently ambiguous because
Congress failed to anticipate adequately and provide for the wvide
variety of forms insider trading can take. Contrary to congressional
expectation, "grey targets," whose outward appearances do not indicate
whether they fall inside or outside of the line, have emerged. Inequity
between indisputable inside targets and grey targets has arisen. In
addition, the grey targets have been placed in an insecure position,
thus impairing the legal stability of society and the predictability of
economic transactions.

104. For a thorough analysis of the rationale of the six-month limitation period and its
application to actual situations, see Comment, Section 16(b): An Alternate Approach to the
Six-Month Limitation Period, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1289 (1973).
105. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
106. An Economic Analysis, supra note 9, at 409.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 412.
109. Id. at 411 (footnote omitted); accord, R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 38. at 1173.
110.

Munter, supra note 62, at 72, 74.
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1. Section 16(b) Limitations: Their Inherent Ambiguity, Inequity,
and Inefficiency
a. The Six-Month Limitation
An insider who purchases stock and sells it exactly six months later
(e.g., a purchase at 8:00 a.m. on January 15 followed by a sale at 4:00
p.m. on July 14 would be a transaction of exactly six months) is not
within the statutory period of "less than" six months' and is therefore
not a target of section 16(b), while an insider who sells just one day
earlier (e.g., at any time on July 13)112 is subject to the section. If the
latter insider has not actually used inside information while the
former insider has, the inequitable imbalance is obvious. The speculative value of inside information would never become obsolete by the
passage of just one day unless there is a public disclosure of the
information. Although "ordinarily the useful life of 'confidential' inside
information is brief," 113 it is very likely that inside information concerning mergers, new technological developments, or oil or metal
14
resource discoveries probably will survive for more than six months.'
Thus, the section can never preclude the opportunity for making a
profit by using inside information.
b.

The Status of the Insider Limitation

Under section 16(b), only persons who have the status of either
"director," or "officer," or "ten percent beneficial owner" can be targets
of liability. One of the most significant sources of inefficiency and
inequity under this limitation is that such insiders can evade liability
and pocket virtually all of the speculative profit by tipping off their
confidants. 1 15 Here again, section 16(b) functions only as a fishing net
for minnows.
c.

The Ten Percent at Times of Purchase and Sale Limitation

(i) The Ten Percent Limitation: This limitation has functioned as a
guidepost by which insiders can evade liability under section 16(b),
thus demonstrating the inefficiency of the automatic mechanism. In
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.,116 the defendant EmerIll. R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 38, at 1211.
112. Id.
113. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892
(1965).
114. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
115. The original draft of § 16(b) provided that tipping or exchanging activity would be
unlawful and that any profit made by such activity %ould be recoverable by the issuer. H.R.
7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b), 78 Cong. Rec. 2378 (1934).
116.

404 U.S. 418 (1972).
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son Electric Co., the owner of 13.2% of a corporation's shares,

disposed of its entire holdings in a split-sale, with both sales occurring within six months of purchase. The first sale reduced the
defendant's holdings to 9.96% and the second disposed of the remainder. The Supreme Court held that the profits derived from the second7
sale were not recoverable by the corporation under section 16(b). 1
Although the ten percent limitation was used as a guidepost for
escaping liability, the Court stated that "[l]iability cannot be imposed
simply because the investor structured1 8 his transaction with the intent
of avoiding liability under §16(b)."'

By using split-sales, a beneficial owner can retain practically all of
the speculative profits. In addition, he does not have to separate his
purchase and sale by six months or more. Thus, by repeating this trick
during the useful life of the inside information, the beneficial owner
can make a large profit while having to disgorge only a very slight
portion of it.
(ii) The Timing of the Ten Percent Limitation: The Supreme Court,
in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 119 held that
the purchase of securities by an insider who, for the first time, becomes
a more than ten percent beneficial owner is not covered by section
16(b). 120 Thus, insiders no longer have to go to the trouble of splitting
their sales in order to avoid liability. They can simply sell their entire
holdings in one sale, and no disgorgement will be required. By
sanctioning an even more profitable way for escaping liability than
previously existed under Reliance Electric, Foremost-McKesson has
savagely extracted the teeth out of section 16(b). To understand the
combined result of these two
cases consider the series of transactions
121
set out in Table 1 below.

TRANSACTION

% OF SHARES
TRADED
12

Purchase

Purchase
Sale
Sale

5
7.0001
9.9999

TOTAL % OWNED
BY INSIDER

DATE

12

May i

17
9.9999
0

July I
Sept. 1
Sept. 5

TABLE 1

117.

Id. at 420.

118. Id. at 422.
119. 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
120. Section 16(b) provides that the section shall not be construed to cover any transaction in
which the beneficial owner was not such "at the time of" both the purchase and sale of the

securities involved. The issue was whether the words "at the time of" mean prior to or
simultaneous with. Id. at 235.
121. This table is based on an example in R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 38, at 1189.
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An insider who followed the above series of transactions would be
liable only for the profit realized on shares purchased on July 1 that
were sold on September 1. The May 1 purchase would not be
considered because the insider was not a ten percent holder prior to
that purchase and the September 5 sale would not be considered
because the insider was not a ten percent holder either prior to or after
that sale.

122

2.

"Grey Targets": Inequity and Instability

The emergence of grey targets has shattered the congressional dream
that the rigid structure of section 16(b) would make its automatism
highly efficient. 123 To determine whether these grey targets are covered by the section, courts have been forced to inquire into the
subjective substance of the grey targets. 124 Inequity between orthodox
targets and grey targets has been created because orthodox targets are
automatically liable under section 16(b) whereas grey targets are
subject to section 16(b) only if an examination of the circumstantial
facts of the transaction reveals a possibility of speculative abuse of
inside information. 125 The inquiry into subjective substance has also
caused arbitrary application of the section. As one commentator precisely indicated, "the 'possibility of abuse' test is vague enough to allow
divergent conclusions from the same facts."'1 26 Since liability is auto-

matic under section 16(b), inequity and arbitrariness have engendered
serious legal instability.
a. "Purchase" and "Sale"
The use of the terms "purchase" and "sale" has produced many
perplexing grey targets. Congressional definitions of these terms in the
statute 127 were too simple and abstract to be adequate guidelines for
determining whether a particular grey target was within the purview
of the section. A few problematical grey targets are: conversions, 128
122. Foremost-McKesson concerned only purchase-sale transactions. The Supreme Court has
yet to choose its policy concerning sale-repurchase transactions and there is considerable disagreement among the lower courts on this point. Compare Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W.
Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) with Provident Sec.
Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), qff'd, 423 U.S. 232 (1976);
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 418 (1972);
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956) and Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d at 302

(Hincks, J., dissenting).
123. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 134, 144, 149, 152, 156 infra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 149, 152, 160 infra and accompanying text.
126. An Economic Analysis, supra note 9, at 401.
127. See Securities and Exchange Act § 3(a)(13), (14), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14)
(1976).

128. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1978); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7826 (Feb.
17, 1966), reprinted in [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 77,329.
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transfers of shares in connection with mergers or consolidations,1" 9
reclassifications of stock, 1 30 options, 13 1 and gifts.13 2 These transactions

are different in character than the orthodox cash-for-stock transactions. In wrestling with these unorthodox grey targets, 133 the majority
of courts have taken the pragmatic approach by examining subjective
elements of a transaction to decide whether it is a target of section
16(b). 1 3 4 On the other hand, the minority view of the courts is to take
an objective approach, refusing to analyze the subjective nature of a
transaction. 1 35 The existence of two approaches, which conflict in both
their philosophies and ramifications, 13 6 is itself the source of perplexity
37
and confusion. 1

b.

Status of Insider

(i) Director: Section 3(a)(7) of the 1934 Act defines the term "director" as "any director of a corporation or any person performing
129. Compare Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970) ("objective"
pragmatic approach), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970) with Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) ("medium" pragmatic approach), and Gold v.
Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973) ("subjective" pragmatic approach), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974). Each court took a pragmatic approach. The comparison of these three cases reveals that
a pragmatic approach leads to arbitrary results, thereby creating legal instability.
130. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1954).
131. See Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); cf. Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 602 (1973) (option agreement in question did not offer
"measurable possibilities for speculative abuse"). But see Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693
698 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971). 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-6(b) (1978) provides in
pertinent part: "For the purpose of section 16(a) of the Act both the grantor and the holder of any
presently exercisable put, call, option or other right or obligation to buy or sell securities shall be
deemed to be beneficial owners of the securities subject to such right or obligation until it is
exercised or canceled or expires."
132. Mere gifts of securities do not constitute sales. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). But see Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 17 C.F.R. §
240.16a-9(b) (1978).
133. See generally 5 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3027-48 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); 2 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 1066-84 (2d ed. 1961).
134. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973);
Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Petteys v. Butler,
367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954).
135. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Reliance
Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156
(3d Cir. 1965); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
136. For the study of these two approaches, see Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in
Regulating Insider Trading, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 45 (1968).
137. Comment, Section 16(b): Judicial Inconsistency in Application of the Pragmatic Approach, 5 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 731, 748 (1974).
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similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated." ' 138 Unfortunately, however, this definition is
too broad to lessen the ambiguity of the term. In addition, a partnership or corporation that deputizes one of its members or directors to
act as a director of another company will itself be held liable as a
director under section 16(b).1 39 The so-called "deputization theory" has
caused considerable controversy. 140 First, because the concept of deputization is not yet well settled and the elements of deputization are
dependent upon a case-by-case approach, 14 1 it is difficult to predict
when courts will invoke the theory. Second, because of the theory's
ambiguity, there is a fear of unfettered expansion 42 by a capricious
court.'

43

Third, in order to determine whether there has been a

deputization, courts seem to have taken a subjective approach; sometimes they further inquire into whether there was actual use of inside
information by the partnership/corporation or whether the member/di44
rector intended to act as a deputy.
(ii) Officer: The 1934 Act does not define the term "officer."' 145 The
SEC defines "officer" as "a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to
those performed by the foregoing officers. ' 14 6 The scope of the definition, however, has not been clearly established. Three different tests
have been developed to define the term "officer": the literal test; the
functional test; and the subjective test. Under the literal test, the scope
of the term "officer" is determined primarily by the title of the insider,
regardless of his real function and responsibility. 14 7 Under the functional test, on the other hand, "[t]he question is what this particular
employee was called upon to do in this particular company, i.e., the
relation between his authorized activities and those of this corpora138.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1976).
139. See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 410 (1962) (dictum); Feder v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262-66 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).

140.

The theory originated with Judge Learned Hand in Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564,

567 (2d Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion).

141.
142.

Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
See Deitz, A PracticalLook at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43 Fordham

L. Rev. 1, 4 (1974).

143. Compare Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937, 945-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
rev'd, 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970) with Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 264-66 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
144. See, e.g., Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 406
F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
145. Deitz, supra note 143, at 4 ("The definition of an officer for section 16(b) purposes ... is
far from settled.").
146. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1978).
147. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282, 285-86 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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tion."'1 4 8 Recently, the courts have shifted to a subjective test. The
major element of this test is whether a specific insider had the
opportunity to abuse inside information. 149 This test, as alluded to
earlier, while being flexible,
allows the courts to be arbitrary and
1 50
impairs legal predictability.
(iii) Timing of the Status as Director or Officer: Congress unfortunately failed to indicate when a person, with respect to transactions he
engages in, has to be an officer or director to be subject to section
16(b). Legal instability has resulted. Theoretically, as illustrated by
Table 2, six cases are possible.

0

0

4

TENURE AS A

S

DIRECTOR OR OFFICER]

--

2

0

3

6

SIX MONTHS

LEGEND
o PURCHASE OR SALE
* SALE OR REPURCHASE

TABLE

2

In transaction 1, in which a person is a "director" or "officer" both at
the time of the purchase and sale or at the time of the sale and
148.

Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1949).

149.

Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Morales v. Holiday Inns,

Inc., 366 F. Supp. 760, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Selas Corp. v. Voogd, 365 F. Supp. 1268, 1271
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
150. See Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cet. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). The

Gold court concluded that since the defendant was ignorant of inside events--in this case, merger
developments--there was no possibility of abuse. Id. at 351.
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repurchase, he is subject to the section. No clear-cut judicial rules
have been established for the other types of transactions. 11 Some
courts have inquired into the subjective aspect of transactions, that is,
the possibility of abuse of inside information, in determining whether
these other types of transactions are covered by the section.' S2 Such a
pragmatic or subjective approach under the automatism of the section
significantly impairs predictability because while courts seem willing to
inquire into the subjective circumstances of a transaction to establish
the possible abuse of inside information, they never permit insiders to
prove their real intent or actual nonuse of such information. Thus, this
approach is apt to lead to arbitrary results. 15 3 Furthermore, an inequitable inbalance arises between targets with which this approach is used
and targets which are automatically subject to section 16(b). One can
safely argue that to conduct a subjective inquiry in only one type of
transaction (such as 2 or 3) and not in the other (such as 1) would be
unfair.
(iv) Beneficial Owner: Congress failed to define the term "beneficial owner."'15 4 Thus, the same problems found in connection with
the meanings of "officer" and "director" arise in this area as well. In
1935, the SEC described "beneficial ownership" as a position in which
"by reason of any contract, understanding, relationship, agreement or
other arrangement [a person] has benefits substantially equivalent to
those of ownership.' 1 5 5 This abstract definition, however, was of no
assistance in predicting whether a person would be deemed a beneficial
owner, and courts have resorted 15to6 the subjective approach to decide
who falls within this definition.
Uncertainty in the notion of beneficial ownership plunges family
members into an insecure situation. In 1966, the SEC issued a release
which considerably expanded its 1935 definition of the term. The SEC
ruled that absent special circumstances, "a person is regarded as the
151. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (type 2 is covered); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970) (type3 i.covered); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840
(2d Cir. 1959) (same); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (same). Courts have not yet discussed type 6. See Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The
PragmaticApproach to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. L. Rev. 221,
259 (1975).
152. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1036 (1970); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
153. See, e.g., Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Levy, a corporate officer
who engaged in a type 5 transaction three months after severance from the corporation was held
not liable. Id. at 5-6.
154. See Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 6555-56.
155. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 175 (Apr. 16, 1935).
156. See Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 1054, 1065 (1966); Wentz, supra note 151, at 261.
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beneficial owner of securities held in the name of his or her spouse and
their minor children. 11 57 Undoubtedly, the basic philosophy behind
the SEC's release is that the opportunity for abuse of inside information could generally pass from one family member to another through a
family tie. The SEC has indicated that under its definition, "[t]he fact
that ownership of securities and transactions in those securities are
reported under Section 16(a) .

.

.

does not necessarily mean that

liability will result therefrom under Section 16(b).' 5 8 Nevertheless,
courts seem receptive to using the SEC's definition to impose section
16(b) liability.1 59 The danger of unfettered expansion of the scope of
section 16(b) looms if the concept of a family tie is used to ensnare a
person for whom the opportunity to abuse inside information is only a
theoretical possibility.1 60
F.

Two Regulatory Mechanismsfor One CongressionalPurpose:
An Incidental Cost

Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 currently effect the same congressional
aim as section 16(b) does, albeit in a different way. Section 16(b) aims
to deter speculative insider trading by compelling insiders to disgorge
profits, whereas rule 10b-5 aims to achieve the same end by imposing
compensatory liability on insiders. The coexistence of these two mechanisms, for the same congressional purpose, raises the problem of
1 61
double liability.

157. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966), 31 Fed. Reg. 1005
(1966).
158. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7824 (Feb. 14, 1966), 31 Fed. Reg. 3175
(1966).
159. See, e.g., Schur v. Salzman, 365 F. Supp. 725, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
160. See, e.g., Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975). The holding of
securities by a trust, partnership, or corporation has created problems similar to the one that
exists when a family member holds securities. Regarding the holding of securities by a trust, see
Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 966-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 17 C.F.R. §
240.16a-8(a),(c),(e) (1978); Wentz, supra note 151, at 264-66. Regarding the holding of securities
by a partnership, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1965 (Dec. 21, 1938), 11 Fed.
Reg. 10,970, 10,970-71 (1946); Feldman & Teberg, supra note 156, at 1078-79; Wentz, supra note
151, at 264 n.139. Regarding the holding of securities by a corporation, see SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 1965, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,970, 10,970-71 (1946). Compare Blau v.
Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954) with Marquette
Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
161. ALI Fed. Securities Code § 1413, Comment 21 (Tent. Draft. No. 2 1973); see SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Pappas v. Moss,
257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966), revid on other grounds, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968). In
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 A.D.2d 285, 290, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300, 305 (1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), the court recognized that defendants-directors in a
shareholder's derivative action might incur double liability if they were also sued by the
purchasers of their stock for failure to disclose material information. See generally 6 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 3646-47 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1473-74 (2d
ed. 1961).
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Arguably, as one supporter of exposing insiders to double recovery
states, "the causes of action created by the two sections are noticeably
different in purpose and scope," 162 and "[insiders] simply run afoul of
two distinct sections of the Exchange Act."'1 63 Furthemore, "if there is
active fraud by the purchasing insider, a strong argument in favor of
double recovery can be made on the basis that the single purchase
involved wrongs against both the corporation and the selling shareholder.'164
These arguments, however, overlook the fact that Congress did not
construct the double recovery system in the 1934 Act with the intent of
wrestling with insider trading. 1 65 "Section 10(b) was not primarily
designed to handle the insider trading problem, dealt with expressly by
Section 16(b). Rather it was intended as a general prohibition of a
relatively wide variety of deceitful or manipulative practices .... ,,166
Moreover, the private recovery system under rule 10b-5 was not
contemplated by the SEC when adopting the rule; 167 the system has
course of subsequent judicial construction and
been developed in the 168
expansion of the rule.
Seeking to achieve a deterrent effect, Congress designed section
16(b) to compel forfeiture of speculative profits from insiders, and to
that end, corporations were chosen as the operational instrument. As
discussed earlier, the sole theoretical underpinning for corporations'
cause of action-the agency-based corporate assets theory-has proven
to be suspect. 169 Section 16(b) rests on a legal fiction that results in
channeling compensation to issuing corporations even though they
have not been victimized by insiders.
The double recovery system has no reasonable basis in public policy.
Although there is some deterrent effect in divesting insider-agents of
profits derived from exploiting information gained by virtue of their
positions, the necessity of relieving victims of insider trading and
reallocating resources to them should have priority over the necessity
to compel the insider-agent to disgorge such profits and to account to
the principal for them. Divestiture under section 16(b) usually worsens
the financial condition of the wrongdoer and thereby impedes the
162. Comment, The Prospectsfor Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1140 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Prospects].
163. Id. at 1141.
164. Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 Cornell
L.Q. 53, 68 (1960) (footnote omitted).
165. See W. Painter, Federal Regulation of Insider Trading 19 (1968).
166. Id.
167. "§ 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is
no indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a
remedy ......
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
168. W. Painter, supra note 165, at 21-22.
169. See pt. I(B)(1) supra.

19791

INSIDER TRADING REGULATION

granting of relief to rule 10b-5 plaintiffs, particularly when, as usually
is the case, the injured party does not have a cause of action against
the issuing corporation which received the divested profits. Moreover,
the disgorgement mechanism of section 16(b) is automatic and stronger
than the compensation and recovery mechanism available to injured
parties under rule 10b-5, and as a result puts such parties at a
disadvantage.
The court in Diamond v. Oreamuno,170 then, misconstrued the issue
when it argued:
[T]he mere possibility of such a suit [asking for recovery of damages] is not a defense
nor does it render the complaint insufficient. It is not unusual for an action to be
brought to recover a fund which may be subject to a superior claim by a third party. If
that be the situation, a defendant should not be permitted to retain the fund for his
own use on the chance that such a party may eventually appear.' 7 '

The issue is not the propriety of an affirmative defense of double
liability, but the inequity of a disgorgement mechanism which generally permits a noninjured corporate issuer to recover more easily than
injured parties. In short, the problem is to whom the profits should be
reallocated. If one operates under the assumption that profits should be
reallocated to the injured parties, there is little justification for having
a double recovery system which acts as an obstacle to reallocation.
How then can the risk of double liability be eliminated? Professor
Stevens argues for giving precedence to the relief of injured parties:
The just result would seem to be to stay the corporate action, if one has been brought,
to await the outcome of the suit by the shareholder in his individual right; if he

recovers, that will diminish the172purchaser's profit and should constitute a defense to
the corporate cause of action.
Stevens' suggestion does not represent a complete solution to the
problem of double liability, despite the validity of its underlying
philosophy, because it is difficult for potential rule lOb-5 plaintiffs to
find a pending section 16(b) action and because a section 16(b) action
can be stayed pending a rule 10b-5 action only when both actions are
simultaneously available. Furthemore, even if a defendant could stay
the section 16(b) action, there is no guarantee under the existing case
law that the recovery to the injured parties in the rule 10b-5
action is a
173
legally cognizable defense to the section 16(b) action.
The second possible solution to the double liability problem is using
the device of interpleader. 174 This solution is unfair because it compels
170. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
171. Id. at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
172. R. Stevens, Handbook of the Law of Private Corporations § 150, at 702 (2d ed. 1949)
(footnote omitted).
173. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86174. ALI Fed. Securities Code § 1413, Comment 21 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
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the injured parties to fight with the corporation in order to assert their
rights. In other words, since the injured parties should recover in any
event (even after the accounting to the corporation), interpleader is
inappropriate. Insiders should not be in a position to say to the injured
parties, " 'Fight it out; we'll pay the winner.' ",175 In addition, there
are technical difficulties in utilizing interpleader, that is, there is doubt
under the present trend of court opinions whether
the prerequisites for
176
interpleader can be satisfied in this situation.
The third possible method for avoiding double liability is to enact a
provision against double liability such as the one found in section
77
1714(i) of the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code.1
Section 1714(i) provides:
The profit [derived from short-term insider trading] is reduced by the amount of any
damages, interest, and costs (not including the defendant's attorneys' fees) paid by the
defendant to sellers or buyers in the transactions in question pursuant to (1) a
judgment on a claim under [the antifraud provisions] or a comparable claim under
State or foreign law or (2) settlement of such a claim if the defendant proves that the
settlement was not collusive. If the defendant makes any such payment after he has
paid the profit [derived from short-term insider trading] to the issuer, he may recover
the amount of the payment in an action against the issuer, but in no event thore than
the net amount received by the issuer after payment by it (or out of the amount paid by
178
the [insider/defendant]) of all costs ....

A close examination of section 1714(i) reveals that it will be inadequate. At least two problematic situations are conceivable. The first is
the case in which, after the judgment in a rule 10b-5 litigation is
rendered, a section 16(b) action is brought. The defendant can raise a
defense that the payment to the injured parties destroyed his profit.
Yet, such a defense is available only to the extent of "the amount of any
damages, interest, and costs (not including the defendant's attorneys'
fees) paid by the defendant to sellers or buyers."'1 79 Because of the
highest-in-lowest-out formula for the computation of profits under
section 16(b), 180 the usefulness of such a defense will be considerably
circumscribed. In addition, even a slight excess of profits under section
16(b) will create the risk of double litigation. The financial burden of
the defendant's attorney's fees represents nothing less than substantial
double liability.
The second problematic case is that in which a rule 10b-5 litigation
has been brought after the delivery of a judgment in a section 16(b)
175.

R. Field & B. Kaplan, Materials for a Basic Course in Civil Procedure 148 (3d ed. 1973).

176. Because the courts tend to regard the causes of action created by §§ 10(b) and 16(b) as
separate and distinct, see Prospects, supra note 162, at 1140-42, it is unlikely that the requirements for interpleader can be fulfilled. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22.
177. ALI Fed. Securities Code § 1714(i). (Proposed Official Draft (1978)).
178.

Id.

179. Id.
180. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
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litigation. In this case, section 1714(i) is ineffectual in preventing
double liability. It provides a way by which insiders can recover from
the corporation only after being exposed to the burden of double
litigation. Furthermore, it is theoretically possible that shareholders of
the corporation can stop it from paying the insider the amount of the
rule 10b-5 judgment against him by alleging that it constitutes waste of
corporate assets, or that after payment they can raise a derivative
action for waste of corporate assets. If these attacks by shareholders
are successful, the risk of double liability will be substantial despite the
scrupulous draftsmanship of the Federal Securities Code.
The basic unfairness of section 1714(i) is that it does not focus on
providing relief to injured parties. The roundabout method of letting
insiders recover from the corporation after their payment to the injured
parties not only heightens the risk of double liability, but also impedes
the smooth granting of relief to the injured parties. Section 1714(i)
should have provided a way by which the injured parties could
directly sue the corporation to the extent of the amount of the profit.
All of the previously described attempts at avoiding double liability,
which were predicated on the existence of section 16(b), do not
function well. The ultimate solution is the elimination of section 16(b).
The consequence of enacting a provision like section 1714(i) would be
to confine the function of section 16(b) to the scope of rule 10b-5-the
amount of any damages paid by the insiders to the injured parties.
Thus, one of the main raisons d'etre of section 16(b) would be lost.' 8 1
Furthermore, because of the automatism of section 16(b), the issuing
corporation usually acquires the limited resources earlier than the
injured parties. To allocate the resources, which ultimately belong to
the injured parties, to the corporation first and thereafter to reallocate
these resources to the injured parties represents nothing more than an
unnecessary transfer of resources. In addition, the social resources
themselves may be consumed and decline in value during transfer, for
example, by the payment of attorney's fees. The methods for avoiding
double liability on the precondition of the existence of section 16(b) are
inconsistent with not only the judicial policy favoring relief to injured
parties, but also with the social policy of conserving resources.
G.

To Repeal or Not To Repeal

The critical questions this Article has examined are whether society
needs section 16(b) and whether it is wise to maintain the mechanism
in terms of its costs and benefits to society. The foregoing analysis has
shown that insider trading has some benefits (B) for society. Since
benefits from insider trading exist, the costs of social losses caused by
181.

See pt I supra.
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diminishing the positive values of insider trading (C2) also exist.'1 2 The
costs of enforcement (C3 ) by attorneys as federal policemen are not only
a huge 183 but also an unseemly expense for society. Section 16(b)'s
ambiguities discourage early settlements and encourage subsequent
appeals. Moreover, under section 16(b), society has to bear the enforcement costs even when defendants do not harm society. The cost
of errors under section 16(b) is considerable because the section applies
to every instance of insider trading that comes within the six-month
limitation regardless of whether it is detrimental to the regulatory
purpose. 184 Finally, the foregoing analysis has revealed that in addition to the aforementioned costs, section 16(b) involves several incidental costs (Cs). These are the costs of inequity, unpredictability, misallocating social resources
(cost of impending relief to victims), and
18 5
double liability.
The costs and benefits of section 16(b) are presented in Figure 5.
Section 16(b) falls outside of the beneficial range of enforcement
(P2_P3). The costs of the section exceed its benefits. Professor Loss
states that "§ 16(b) has a symbolic significance that must be, and

k (C1 +C2+C3+C4+C5)

PERCENT OF ENFORCEMENT
FIGURE 5
182.

See pt. II(B) supra.

183.
184.
185.

See pt. II(C) supra.
See pt. II(D) supra.
See pt. II(E), (F) supra.
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deserves to be, recognized."' 8 6 Presumably, by "a symbolic significance" he means that "it is just as important for the markets as for
the courts not merely to do equity but to appear to do equity."' 18 7 Such
"a symbolic significance" does not deserve to be maintained at such
exorbitant cost, especially in view of the fact that the federal securities
regulation scheme now has, in addition to section 16(a)'s filing requirements 1 88 and section 16(c)'s prohibition against short sales,' 8 9 rule
10b-5's antifraud provisions.
Rule 10b-5, unlike section 16(b), is not an automatic, 100% enforcement mechanism. The rule prohibits only the actual abuse of
insider information. Furthemore, it is a compensation mechanism used
primarily by private plaintiffs who are victims of insider trading.
Because of these characteristics, rule 10b-5 can be enforced less
expensively and more equitably than section 16(b).
Ill.

INSIDER TRADING REGULATION

IN JAPAN

Recently in Japan, there have been movements for reinforcement of
the present regulatory scheme which includes an analogue to section
16(b). The necessity for reinforcement is clear. However, the manner
in which the present regulatory scheme should be reinforced requires
careful and critical consideration. The earlier discussion of the American experience under section 16(b) is fecund with suggestions as to the
applicability of section 16(b)-type regulation to Japan.
A.

Present Regulatory System
1. The Statutory Scheme

The present statutory scheme for the regulation of insider trading in
Japan consists of the provision for the disgorgement of short-swing
186. ALI Fed. Securities Code § 1413, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973)
187. 5 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 2999 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
188. Section 16(a) provides: "Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on a national
securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement filed
pursuant to section
781(g) of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer,
a statement with the Commission (and, if such security is registered on a national securities
exchange, also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he
is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if
there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission
(and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the
exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1976).
189.

Section 16(c) is quoted at note 77 supra.
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profit (article 189 of the SEL), 190 the antifraud provision (article 58 of
the SEL), 19 1 and the prohibition of insider trading by the officers or
employees of a securities corporation (article 50 of the SEL 9 2 and the
Ministerial Order in accordance with it' 93 ). Article 189 of the SEL
provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of secret information of a corporation
which may have been obtained by any officer or major shareholder (the term refers to
the shareholder or the contributor who holds or owns more than ten percent of the
corporation's total number of issued shares or the total amount of contributions in his
own name or in the name of other persons including fictitious person; the same shall
apply hereinafter) of the corporation by reason of his office or position in the
corporation, if such person realizes any profit by doing purchase within six months
after sale, or sale within six months after purchase, of shares of the corporation, the
corporation may claim him to tender such profit to the corporation.
2. If the corporation fails to claim, in accordance with the provisions of the
preceding paragraph, within sixty days after any shareholder of the corporation made
a request that the corporation shall claim in accordance with the provisions of the
preceding Paragraph, such shareholder may claim in the name of and on behalf of the
corporation.1 94

The SEL provides criminal and administrative sanctions against the
violations of the foregoing provisions. An intentional violator of article
58 will receive a criminal sanction. 195 When such violator is a securi190. Article 189 is quoted at text accompanying note 194 infra.
191. Article 58 of the SEL states in pertinent part: "No person shall commit an act described
in the following Items: (1) To employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with respect to
buying, selling or other transactions of securities. (2) To obtain money or other property by using
documents or by any representation which contain an untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary to make the statements therein not misleading."
Shokentorihiki Ho (Securities Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 58(1), (2) (1971). This
and all subsequent citations to the Japanese Securities Exchange Law are made to an English
translation: Japan Securities Research Institute, Securities and Exchange Law (1975).
192. Article 50 of the SEL states in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any securities
corporation, its officers or employees to commit such act as described in the following Items:...
(3) Such acts relating to buying, selling or other transactions of securities, other than those
referred to in the preceding two paragraphs, as may be prescribed by the Ministerial Order as
prejudicial to the protection of investors, detrimental to the fairness of transactions or undermining the credibility of the securities industry." Shokentorihiki Ho (Securities Exchange Law), Law
No. 25 of 1948, art. 50(3) (1971).
193. The Ministerial Order provides that transactions by officers or employees of securities
corporations based upon inside information received while in their capacity as officers or
employees shall constitute unlawful conduct under article 50 of the SEL. Shokengaisha no
Kenzensei no Junsokuto ni kansuru Shorei, Ministry of Finance Order No. 60, § 1(5) (Nov. 5,
1965).
194. Shokentorihiki Ho (Securities Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 189(1), (2) (1971).
The article further provides: "3. The right to claim to the officer or major shareholder under
the provisions of the preceding two Paragraphs shall be cancelled unless the claimant exercised it
within two years from the date on which such profit was realized.
"4. The provisions of the preceding three Paragraphs shall not be applied to the case where
such major shareholder was not such either at the time of purchase or sale." Id. art. 189(3), (4).
195. SEL art. 197 provides in pertinent part: "Any person who comes under any of the
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ties corporation or "a registered representative" 1 96 of a securities
corporation, he will be subject to administrative sanction, such as
cancellation of license or suspension of business. 197 The same kind of
adfninistrative sanction is applied to violators of article 50 of the
SEL.

19 8

2.

Lack of Enforcement of the Statutory Scheme

The statutory provisions against insider trading have rarely been
enforced in Japan. Since its enactment, article 189 has been invoked
only once. 19 9 In 1963, Shokusanjutakusogo Kabushikikaisha Corporation brought an action under the article against its former chief
executive officer to recover the short-swing profit he had made. 20 0 In
addition, no civil, criminal, or administrative action in which article
58 was applied to insider trading has been reported. 20 1 Furthemore,
there has been no case in which the Ministry of Finance has asked a
court to issue an injunction against insider trading as provided for in
article 187 of the SEL. 20 2 The lack of enforcement of the statutory
scheme, however, should not be equated with the absence of insider

trading in Japan. Several cases of suspected insider trading have been
reported. 20

3

Moreover, in Japan directors and officers usually acquire

following Items shall be confined to imprisonment for not more than three years or be fined not
more than three hundred thousand yen: .. .(2) Any person who has violated the provisions of
Article 58 .... ." Id. art. 197(2).
196. A "registered representative" includes officers or employees of a securities corporation
engaging in buying and selling of securities, acting as brokers, or the like. See id, art. 62.
197. See id. arts. 35, 64-3.
198. Id.
199. A. Takeuchi & S. Michida, supra note 5, at 532 n.5; Horiguchi, Torishimariyaoku no
Futo Rieki no Teikyo (1), 656 Shojihomu 1 (1974); Ripporonteki Kosatsu, supra note 8, at 700; see
Shoken Torihikiho Kenkyukai, Beikoku Renposhokenhotenan no Kenkyu (2), Inbesutomento,
June 1975, at 39, 42 [hereinafter cited as Beikoku (2)]; Shoken Torihikiho Kenkyukai, Bdikoku
Renposhokenhotenan no Kenkyu (1), Inbesutomento, April 1975, at 23, 41.
200. Horiguchi, supra note 199.
201. See Kanzaki, supra note 8, at 761; Takeuchi, supra note 8, at 139, Ripporonteki
Kosatsu, supra note 8, at 700.
202. Takeuchi, supra note 8, at 140. Article 187 of the SEL provides in pertinent part: "Court
may, if it deems it urgent and essential, and necessary and appropriate for the public interest and
for the protection of investors, upon plea from the Minister of Finance, order any person, who
engages or is about to engage in any act which constitutes a violation of this Law or Order issued
under this Law, to cease or suspend such action." Shokentorihiki Ho (Securities Exchange Law),
Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 187 (1971).
203. See, e.g., Nippon Netsugaku, 780 Shojihomu 30 (Osaka Dist. Ct. 1977). The court,
however, did not deal with the issue of insider trading. The case is discussed in: Kanzaki,
Nippon Netsugaku Jiken no Hotekikento, 676 Shojihomu 2 (1974); Nippon Keizai Shinbun, May
23, 1974, at 15. For an international reaction to the case, see Wall St. J., June 19, 1974, at 1,col.
6. For a discussion of other cases, see: Horiguchi, supra note 199; Nippon Keizai Shinbun, Feb.
2, 1979, at 13; id., Feb. 23, 1978, at 13; id.,Feb. 21, 1978, at 15; Asahi Shinbun, Sept. 4, 1973,
at 18.
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20 4

Further-

more, some commentators maintain that corporations in Japan tend to
report insider information to banks
or other financial institutions
20 5
earlier than they make it public.
It is extremely important, for purposes of achieving future reinforcement of the regulatory scheme, to analyze the reasons for the
current lack of enforcement. The main reason for the inactivity of
article 189 is said to be the deletion of the filing requirement for
directors, officers, and principal stockholders. Deleted article 188,
which was equivalent to section 16(a) of the 1934 Act, provided that
directors, officers, and principal stockholders file a statement with the
Japanese Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) indicating the amount and kind of all securities owned. It further directed
that if there had been a change in the amount of securities owned, then
a statement indicating such change should be filed with the Commission within ten days after the close of each calendar month. 20 6 Article
188 was deleted in 1953 by the Law for the Partial Amendments
of the
207
Securities Exchange Law (Law for the Partial Amendments).

Most

scholars believe the article was deleted because it had not been
effective; the Commission had not regularly released filings of insiders
or made them public. 208 This explanation originally appeared in a
comment by the government officials
who presumably drafted the Law
20 9
for the Partial Amendments.
Perhaps the real reason for the deletion of article 188 was not its
inefficiency but that it was regarded as excessive. The Law for the
Partial Amendments is described as "the correction of excessiveness of
the laws enacted under the Occupation. ' 2 10 Indeed, immediately after
the termination of the Occupation in April, 1952, the Commission,
which had been an independent agency, was abolished and replaced
204. Shoken Torihikiho Kenkyukai, Renposhokenhotenan no Kenkyu (3), Inbesutomento,
August 1975, at 27, 38 (remarks of Mr.- Kobayashi).
205. Yazawa & Yasui, Shokenseisaku no Kongonokadai, 748 Shojihomu 4, 10 (1976).
206. H. Oda, C. Miwa & M. Sumi, Kaisei Shokentorihikiho, Shoken Toshishintakuho
Kaisetsu 179 (1954) [hereinafter cited as H. Oda].
207. Shokentorihikiho no Ichibu o Kaiseisuru Horitsu (Law for the Partial Amendments of
the Securities Exchange Law), Law No. 142 of 1953; see H. Oda, supra note 206, at 5.
208. See, e.g., Takeuchi, supra note 8, at 138; Tatsuta, Ininjo Kisel Kabushiki Kokai
Kaitsuke: Naibusha Torihiki, in 2 Amerika To Nippon no Shokentorihiki Ho 564 (L. Loss & M.
Yazawa ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited asNaibusha].Some scholars say that since article 188 did not
adopt the beneficial ownership test, insiders had been able to evade the obligation by using
another person's name or a fictitious name. Takeuchi, supra note 8, at 138; Naibusha, supra, at
564.

209. The comment said: "The reason for this filing reauirement was perhaps to be able to
know of selling and buying of stocks in listed corporations by directors or officers of such
corporations and to prevent unfair conduct such as manipulation. Since the article had been
inefficient, it was deleted." H. Oda, supra note 206, at 180 (original in Japanese).
210. Id. at 5.
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by only one section of a bureau of the Ministry of Finance. 21 1 (Presently
the section has been raised to the Securities Bureau.) The opposition of
the business community to article 188 triggered its demise. 2 12 This
opposition is noteworthy because it suggests that far from being
inefficient, the article had some deterrent effect. Apparently, the
reporting requirement, backed by criminal sanction, functioned as
psychological pressure upon insiders to refrain from advantageously
exploiting inside information on the markets. In this connection, it
should be recalled that in the United States, the industry proposals
had concluded that the disclosure provisions of section 16(a) and the
prohibition of short-sales contained in section 16(c) were effective
deterrents to the unfair use of inside information and that further
deterrents, such as section 16(b), were unnecessary. 21 3 In spite of the
deletion of article 188, the SEL still
has article 190 which is equivalent
2 14
to section 16(c) of the 1934 Act.
The fundamental reason for the lack of enforcement under article
189 is, simply stated, the foreign nature of the article and the difficulties of its application to Japan's unique circumstances. At the core of
regulations such as section 16(b) and article 189 are the substantial
delegation of the regulatory power of a nation to private citizens and
the deterrent effect of the disgorgement mechanism. Both are quite
foreign to the Japanese legal structure.
As Professor Ueyanagi points out, the traditional and common
means to attain an administrative purpose in Japan has been through
the imposition of administrative and criminal sanctions. 2 15 A clear
distinction exists between criminal and civil matters. 2 16 Even civil
actions for damages, which are motivated by private interests, have
rarely been deemed a means to attain administrative goals. 2 17 For
instance, the Japanese Antimonopoly Law 2 8 does not contain a provision for treble damages, 21 9 and its provision for strict liability for
211.

T. Suzuki & I. Kawamoto, supra note 5, at 24-25.

212. Mitsuki, Kabushiki Shijo Torihiki niokeru Insaida to Autosaida, Inbesutomento,
Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 14, 16; see K. Kanzaki, Shokentorihikikisei no Kenkyu 149 n.83 (1968).
213. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
214. Article 190 of the SEL provides: "No officer nor major shareholder of a corporation, the
shares of which are listed for trading on a securities exchange, shall sell such portion of the same
shares as he does not have actually." Shokentorihiki Ho (Securities Exchange Law), Law No. 25
of 1948, art. 190 (1971).
215. Beikoku (2), supra note 199.

216.

See Tanaka & Takeuchi, Ho no Jitsugen niokeru Shijin no Yakuwari (1),

88

Hogakukyokaizasshi 521, 527 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ho no Jitsugen (1)].

217. See generaUy Tanaka & Takeuchi, Ho no Jitsugen niokenj Shijin no l'akuwari (4), 89
Hogakukyokaizasshi 1033, 1033-82 (1972).
218. Shitekidokusen no Kinshi oyobi Koseitorihiki no Kakuho nikansuru Horitsu (Antimonopoly Law), Law No. 54 of 1947.
219.

See Ho no Jitsugen (1), supra note 216, at 524.
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damages 220 has been used only a few times, 2 21 notwithstanding the
fact that, in most instances, victims have some private incentive to
bring such action. Thus, it is safe to say that the disgorgement
mechanism, which is not backed by private incentive, is alien to the
Japanese legal system, and its infrequent operation should hardly be
surprising. In addition, because of the disgorgement mechanism's
automatism, it is a form of strict liability. To use strict liability to
achieve the administrative purpose of disgorgement is quite unusual in
Japan, although several
examples of strict liability for private compen22 2
sation do

exist.

The lack of private enforcement in Japan is a symptom of the
monopoly on enforcement by administrative and public agencies. One
manifestation of this monopoly is that administrative agencies have
refrained from assisting plaintiffs in private litigation. 2 23 Japan does
not have a system of amicus curiae by which an administrative agency
can submit a brief in a private litigation. 2 24 Moreover, no case in
which a preceding action by an administrative agency substantially
assisted subsequent private litigation has been reported 225 and no
system of adopting the result of litigation by an administrative agency
as prima facie evidence in a private litigation has been developed.
One of the major factors accelerating the administrative agencies'
monopoly on enforcement is the relative dearth of attorneys in Japan.
The ratio of attorneys to laymen is only one-fourteenth of that in the
United States. 226 The present number of practicing attorneys in Japan
is approximately eleven thousand and only about three or four hundred attorneys are admitted each year. Because attorneys are in short
supply, they have had no need to expand their businesses. 2 27 As a
result, attorneys have no incentive to initiate a system of private
policemen. In summary, because the efficient operation of section
16(b)-type regulation depends heavily upon the philosophy of private
enforcement and the private motives of attorneys, it is a quite natural
and inevitable
consequence that article 189 has not functioned in
8
Japan.
220.

22

Shitekidokusen no Kinshi oyobi Koseitorihiki no Kakuho nikansuru Horltsu (An-

timonopoly Law), Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 25.
221. Ho no Jitsugen (1), supra note 216, at 524-25.
222. See I. Kato, Fuhokoi 5-30 (2d ed. 1974).
223. Tanaka & Takeuchi, Ho no Jitsugen niokeru
Hogakukyokaizasshi 879, 912-15 (1972).
224.

Id.

Shifin

no

Yakuwari

(3),

89

at 912-13.

225. In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that a defendant In a
private damage action is collaterally estopped from relitigating issues of fact previously determined in an injunctive suit brought by the SEC. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645
(1979).

226.
227.
228.

Ho no Jitsugen (1), supra note 216, at 536.
Id. at 539.
K. Fujita, supra note 6, at 305-07; Fujita, supra note 5, at 11.
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3.

Administrative Guidance and Self-Regulation

Because of the inactivity of enforcement under the statutory scheme,
actual regulation of insider trading in Japan has been effected, to a
considerable extent, by administrative guidance and self-regulation.
The circular notice issued in 1971 by the Director of Securities Bureau
of Ministry of Finance to the directors of Regional Finance Bureaus
and the Federation of Japan Securities Business Associations (1971
notice) states, in pertinent part:
Each securities corporation, when accepting orders involving the buying or selling of
stocks in a corporation from directors, officers, or principal shareholders of such a
corporation, . . . shall if necessary confirm backgrounds and reasons for such orders,

and when it seems that such transactions violate laws and regulations, shall warn such
persons, refuse such orders, and report the fact of such refusal to each stock
229
exchange.

Furthermore, one month before the circular notice, a newspaper
reported that the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Exchange) had started
self-regulation against insider trading. 230 The gist of self-regulation is:
(1) the Ministry of Finance and the Exchange will, on behalf of
shareholders, urge violators to disgorge short-swing profit; (2) corporations will submit reports confirming performance of such disgorgement; (3) the Exchange will, when it finds that securities corporations
intentionally participated in such insider trading, impose a fine or
suspend their trading. Approximately two years after the government's
1971 notice, the Exchange issued its own notice to representatives of
listed corporations; this notice warned that transactions by officers or
directors of stocks in their own corporations may violate articles 58
and 189 of the SEL. 2 31 A later Exchange notice emphasized the
importance of the first Exchange notice. 232 In one case the Exchange
successfully compelled a violator to 233
disgorge short-swing profits by
relying on the self-regulatory power.
B.

Movement for Reinforcement

Persistent pressure has been exerted by academicians for new legislation governing insider trading regulation. 234 The Ministry of Finance
229. Okurasho Shokenkyoku, Jikoboshito nitsuite, Zoshohi No. 452 (Feb. 24, 1971), quoted
in Kanzaki, supra note 8, at 760 (original in Japanese).
230. Nippon Keizai Shinbun, Jan. 13, 1971, at 5; see News: Tosho Kaishayakuinto niyoru
Jishakabubaibaino Kisei ni Noridasu, 547 Shojihomu 27 (1971).
231. Tokyo Shoken Torihikisho, Jojokaisha no Kankeisha niyoru Jishakabu no Baibaitorihiki
nitsuite, Toshojokan No. 1621 (Nov. 17, 1972); see Kanzaki, supra note 8, at 760.
232. Tokyo Shoken Torihikisho, Zaimunaiyo no Tekiseikaiji oyobi Jishakabubaibai nitsuite,
Toshojokan No. 120 (Feb. 16, 1973).
233. Takeuchi, supra note 8, at 145.
234. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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(to be exact, the Securities Counselling Commission 235), however, has
not espoused the enthusiasm expressed in academic circles. Instead,
the Ministry has assumed a more cautious attitude. The Ministry of
Finance reasons that reinforcement of administrative and selfregulatory mechanisms is appropriate and amendment of the present
236
statute or new legislation is not necessary.
The negative attitude of the Ministry of Finance has been strongly
criticized by those within the- academic community. 237 In this connec-

tion, the attitude of the Ministry of Justice, as reflected in a recent
questionnaire, is noteworthy. The Ministry of Justice, which has
jurisdiction over amendment of the corporation law, 23 8 sent a questionnaire to various individuals to canvass their respective opinions
concerning possible amendment of the corporation law. 239 The Ministry of Justice asked whether it is appropriate to enact provisions in the
corporation law for preventing directors and the like from abusing
240
inside information. Affirmative responses have been in the majority.
Enactment of such a provision would mean not only the transfer of
articles 58 and 189 of the SEL to the corporation law, but also
reinforcement of insider trading regulation. Although the Ministry of
Justice is not in a position to exercise jurisdiction over the SEL, the
questionnaire obviously gives strong impetus to the movement for
reinforcement.
C. ProposalforJapan
The following is a proposal for Japan on the basis of the foregoing
analysis. Article 189 (the Japanese counterpart to section 16(b)) should
be deleted, provided that the already deleted article 188 (the Japanese
counterpart to section 16(a)) is revived and reinforced, and that article
58 (the Japanese counterpart to section 10(b)) is fundamentally rein235. The Securities Counselling Commission is an advisory organ to the Ministry of Finance
which was established upon the abolition of the Securities and Exchange Commission. T. Suzuki
& I. Kawamoto, supra note 5, at 24-25. SEL art. 165 provides: "A Securities Counselling
Commission . . . shall be established as an auxiliary body to the Ministry of Finance for the
purpose of investigating and deliberating important matters relating to the issuing, buying, selling
and other transactions of securities." Shokentorihiki Ho (Securities Exchange Law), Law No. 25
of 1948, art. 165 (1971).
236. Shokentorihiki Shingikai, Kabunushikosei no Henka to Shihonshijo no Arikata nitsuite
33 (May 11, 1976).

237. See, e.g., Ripporonteki Kosatsu, supra note 8, at 701.
238. Sho Ho (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899.
239. Homusho Minjikyoku Sanjikanshitsu, Kaishaho Kaisei nikansunr Mondaiten (June 12,
1975), reprinted in 728 Shojihomu 33 (1975) and 704 Shojihomu 6 (1975); see Kawamoto,
Takenaka, Yazawa & Shimizu, Torishimariyaku, Torishimariyakukaiseidono Kaizensaku, 707
Shojihomu 2, 22 (1975) (remarks of Professor Yazawa).
240. Inada, Kaishaho Kaisei ni kansuru Kakukai Iken no Bunseki, 728 Shojihomu 4, 18
(1976).
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forced. The disadvantages of section 16(b)/article 189-type regulation
have been discussed above and will not be reiterated. Simply stated, it
is both undesirable and expensive for a society to have such a
regulatory mechanism. One may argue that the mere existence of the
article will do no harm to Japanese society, since it is unlikely that the
article will actually be used. Lack of enforcement of a statute cannot
justify its preservation, but it does support its elimination.
Reinforcement of article 188 is a two-fold process. First, the Ministry of Finance should establish a public release system whereby insider
filings are regularly released to the public. Second, the scope of article
188 should be expanded. Under the deleted version, only directors,
officers, and principal shareholders of corporations whose securities are
listed on any stock exchange were subject to the reporting requirement. 24 1 The opposition of business to article 188 suggests that its

revival will have a substantial deterrent effect on insider trading.2 4 2 A
provision for criminal sanctions against violations of article 188 should
also be revived. Perhaps, most importantly, the Ministry of Finance
should strictly enforce the article. The Ministry should take the
appropriate budgetary measures and augment its staff if necessary to
achieve effective enforcement.
Article 58 should also be reinforced. It should be made clear that
article 58 applies to insider trading and that violators will be subject to
civil liability. 243 Information released under article 188 will provide

substantial assistance for potential plaintiffs who invoke article 58.
The American experience will provide useful suggestions for a
Japanese attempt at reinforcement. However, Professor Tatsuta's proposal, 244 which relies on the Federal Securities Code of the American
Law Institute, is perhaps too detailed and circumstantial to be presently introduced into Japan, where there has been no judicial development in the area ot insider trading liability. To make it unlawful for
insiders to trade on the basis of inside information and to impose civil
liability for rescission or damages as well as criminal penalties upon
insiders would be appropriate and sufficient for present Japan. A
statute patterned after the Corporate Securities Law of California24S
would be compatible with Japanese society. A more detailed scheme of
regulation should await further judicial development.
Finally, administrative supervision and guidance and self-regulation
should be further reinforced, regardless of whether the foregoing
241. See H. Oda, supra note 206, at 179. In contrast, section 16(a) covers non-listed
securities. 15 U.S.C. 78p(a) (1976).
242. See notes 212-13 supra and accompanying text.
243. Yazawa, supra note 5, at 37; see Kanzaki, supra note 8, at 801-02; Takeuchi. supra note
8, at 146.
244. Tatsuta Proposal, supra note 8.
245. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25000-25804 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978); see notes 28-29 supra.
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reinforcement is achieved. In Japan's unique circumstances, even if
article 58 is reinforced, it would not develop as dynamically as rule
lob-5 has and would not be used as frequently as rule 10b-5. 24 6 To
offset this Japanese peculiarity, administrative regulation and self2 47
regulation must play an important role.
246. Professor Loss claims that article 58 of the SEL along with the provision of general tort
liability in article 709 of the Civil Code would develop in the same way as rule lob-S. Loss,
Amerika niokeru Kigyonaibushatorihikitoknini Shinningimu no Gainen o megutte, 10-9 Shokenkeizai Jiho 1, 14 (1970). Article 709 of the Civil Code states: "A person who violates intentionally
or negligently the right of another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom."
Mimpo (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709 (translation in Ministry of Justice, Civil Code
of Japan (1962)). This suggestion, however, is considered optimistic. Judicial development of
article 58 of the SEL is unlikely because Japan, unlike the United States, does not operate under
the common law system.
247. Administrative regulation, including administrative guidance and self-regulation have
functioned as substitutes for private enforcement in Japan. See pt. Il(A)(2), (3) supra. Perhaps
these are the most efficient and least costly regulatory schemes that Japanese society can have.

